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ABSTRACT 
 
Universities have resisted commercializing technology for the greater part of this past 
century.    Until  recently,  only  a  small  number  of  universities  transferred  their 
technology to the public, but now commercialized science is widespread. This study 
explores how the field grew and how different factors affected the diffusion of this 
once illegitimate practice over time. Specifically, this study investigates the adoption 
of  technology  transfer  offices  –  university  employees  committed  to  facilitate  the 
transfer of university technology for commercial use – and how universities’ status, 
identity, and exposure to prior adopters differentially motivated their engagement in 
this activity over time.  
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PREFACE 
 
Universities have resisted taking steps to commercialize their own technology 
for  the  greater  part  of  the  past  century.    Until  recently,  only  a  small  number  of 
universities were involved in the commercial transfer of technology they developed to 
the  public.  Less  than  10%  of  major  research  universities  adopted  offices  to 
commercialize  science  before  1980.  Commercialized  science  became  more 
widespread  in  the  following  years,  however.  The  majority  of  major  research 
universities established a technology transfer office by the turn of the 21
st century, the 
number  of  commercial  agreements  executed  between  the  university  and  industry 
increased from 1,148 in 1991 to 3,606 in 2000 (Association of University Technology 
Managers [AUTM] 2001), and in the life sciences and in many engineering fields, 
university science displaced a great deal of private research and development activity 
in industry by the late 1990’s (Owen-Smith 2000). 
Prior research on university technology transfer activity has examined  both 
recent university licensing performance (Mowery et al 2001, Sine et al 2003) and the 
impact that commercialized science on the academy’s culture (Campbell et al 1996). 
Little attention has been paid to the process by which the field grew – how universities 
emerged as principal engines of invention and economic development in the US (see 
Owen-Smith  2003).  This  paper  fills  the  gap,  exploring  the  commercialization  of 
research in higher education by examining the process by which technology transfer 
offices (administrative offices commercializing university technology) diffused.  
This study is not only substantively unique, but it is also different from most 
accounts of diffusion.  The majority of this work has focused on the rational decision-
making of potential adopters without exploring how context affected the speed and 
direction that a practice spread.  Among the studies that have explored context, there  
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has been a bias toward cases where diffusing items had a normatively prescribed status 
-- rather than a proscribed status.  In this paper, the diffusing practice -- the technology 
transfer  office  --  held  an  illegitimate  status  as  it  started  to  spread  through  the 
population. It did not accord with the cultural understandings of appropriate action 
(Strang and Soule 1998) as it began to diffuse through the field. Practices rarely spread 
through  a  normative  vacuum,  and  in  the  field  of  higher  education,  the 
commercialization  of  science  that  the  technology  transfer  office  represented  was 
particularly offensive to many academics in the 1970’s (Slaughter and Leslie 1997). 
The pursuit of science for profit, while potentially lucrative, represented an approach 
to university science that conflicted with the basic science orientation in the field at 
the time (Merton 1973).  
Structures that do not battle such stigma tend to spread through a population 
based on their own merits (Teece 1980) or get pushed through a population through 
social influence and bandwagon pressures (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Practices that 
are illegitimate are slowed by cultural resistance and diffuse across a population as 
cultural barriers detracting actors from adopting begin to fail. Using 1972 to 2000 data 
on university characteristics and adoptions, I show how both status and identity at the 
individual level and safety-in-numbers at the population level helped to counter and 
erode  these  barriers.  This  research  goes  on  to  show  that  there  was  a  shift  from 
individual-level  to  population-level  factors  over  time.  These  findings  help  sharpen 
one’s understanding of technology transfer management in the US and help illuminate 
the temporal connection between multiple factors and the adoption of structures whose 
legitimacy is open to question.  
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CHAPTER 1 
DIFFUSION LITERATURE 
 
There  have  been  two  major  streams  contained  within  the  contemporary 
literature on inter-organizational diffusion. The first stream, built on the rational actor 
model  (Strang  and  Macy  2001),  has  been  the  most  "diffuse"  perspective  in  the 
diffusion literature (Rogers 1995).  This stream has focused on choices motivated by 
technical factors -- factors that affect efficiency -- and have assumed that the relative 
efficiency  of  a  practice  is  the  primary  driver  of  adoption  speed.  Such  models  are 
attractive in their relative simplicity and generalizability across a diversity of contexts. 
However,  students  of  diffusion  have  been  easily  dissatisfied  with  the  dearth  of 
attention paid to social context in these accounts.  Eager to explore a more realistic, 
comprehensive set of mechanisms that do take social context into account, a second 
stream  of  research  has  emerged.    These  "social"  models  -  alternatively  called 
"contagion accounts" (Strang and Macy 2001) or "institutional perspectives" (Jonsson 
2002) have explored non-technical factors influencing the motivations and decision-
making  capabilities  of  organizational  decision-makers.  In  this  section,  I  divide  the 
diffusion  literature  into  the  two  essential  metatheoretical  perspectives,  and  then  I 
highlight  a  subset  of  the  "social"  perspective  which  has  explored  the  diffusion  of 
illegitimate practices. 
Rational Accounts 
Most accounts of diffusion have assumed that organizations are motivated to 
ensure their continued growth and profitability by adopting practices and structures 
that are singularly cost effective and optimize the transformation of goods and services 
(Chandler 1962; Armour and Teece 1978; Teece 1980).  This explanation has its roots 
in the economics literature, which has assumed that actors are inherently rational, are  
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self-interested,  and  take  the  most  direct  action  to  pursue  their  goals  (Williamson 
1979).  This “rational” view is not unlike the earliest depictions of managers in the 
organizations literature -- organizational engineers, whose decisions and fate were tied 
to arrangements that ensured predictable, reliable, efficient activities in the pursuit of 
collective  goals.  Rational  accounts  favoring  this  mechanical  image  are  intuitively 
appealing,  as  they  focus  on  the  presumed  economic  benefits  that  result  from  the 
adoption of a practice (Teece 1980), and associated models are powerfully predictive 
and elegant in their simplicity, despite their limited complexity and realism.  Critics 
point out that these accounts typically fail to consider social context, which serves to 
constrain the adoption choices actors make (Zucker 1987; Ingram and Clay 2000).  As 
Ronald Coase (1998, p.73) suggests, these accounts can be likened to the larger body 
of work on decision-making in economics, which studies "the circulation of the blood 
without a body." 
This limitation is difficult to ignore in light of the most recent research on 
practice  diffusion,  which  has  demonstrated  that  inefficient  practices  diffuse  in  a 
population  of  organizations  (e.g.  Abrahamson  1991;  Mitroff  and  Morhman  1987; 
Soule 1999) and that efficient practices often stall (Ahmadjian and Robinson 2001; 
Soule 1999).  The concept of "efficiency" is more complex than assumed by core 
rational accounts; this is a theme that has been explored in a second stream of studies, 
which Strang and Macy 2001 call "social" accounts. 
Social Accounts 
While  rational  accounts  conjure  up  the  machine-like  images  of  the 
organization  –  efficient  in  both  its  means  and  ends  --  a  separate  research  stream 
captures the essence of the organization by suggesting a more biological metaphor.  
Such an image suggests that the livelihood of an organization, like a living organism, 
is influenced by interactions with its environment. The organization gains access to  
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resources, which include raw material, human capital, finances, and knowledge - even 
social approval --through these ties.  Like a living organism, the organization depends 
on access to these resources in order to sustain its life.  While studies that invoke this 
image do recognize that organizations face technical pressures from the environment 
and are expected to provide goods and services through markets or exchanges, they 
also assume that expectations are often focused on the means of production, as well as 
on the ends.  In many complex, socially embedded contexts (Granovetter, 1985), the 
public expects that organizations will assume broader societal roles or operate within 
the boundaries of predetermined rules and values, where an organization's choice of 
structures  and  practices  is  often  prescribed  by  actors  and  agents  outside  the 
organization (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Scott 1995).  
Most "social” accounts of diffusion rest within this framework and focus on 
both the gradual  institutionalization of innovative practices within a population and 
the subsequent obligation organizations have to adopt these methods as they reach a 
taken-for-granted status. The emphasis in these analyses is typically on the limited 
agency organizations have in the face of these prescriptions and the relative legitimacy 
organizations possess as they either conform or fail to do so. These accounts often 
present cases where a diffusing practice is suboptimal -- less-than-efficient in solving 
its stated goal. However, due to factors other than efficiency, such as the growing 
awareness  of  the  normative  expectations  of  outside  stakeholders  or  bandwagon 
pressures (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Abrahamson 1991), members of a population 
of organizations grow to accept this practice.   
The  key  mechanism  at  work  here  is  imitation.  Organizations  pattern  their 
behavior  after  their  peers  --  particularly  highly  visible  and  successful  peers  -- 
accepting the number and status of prior adopters as signals of the appropriateness of a 
practice.  Such  a  mechanism  relaxes  assumptions  regarding  the  agency  of  actors,  
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replacing  rational  self-interest  with  group  pressures  and  assumptions  about 
appropriateness  as  decision-making  drivers.  Both  rational  and  social  accounts  do 
describe  the  diffusion  process  in  terms  of  the  efficiency,  albeit  in  different  ways.  
"Rational" adoption of practices is driven by a desire to improve efficiency, while 
"social" adoption is motivated by the desire to appear in conformance with norms 
(Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Scott 1995; Zucker 1977). 
Normative Fit 
By highlighting the role of "context", social accounts add a dimension to the 
diffusion story left out by most rational accounts.  Despite this contribution, however, 
at  times  these  social  accounts  assume  that  practices  spread  without  normative 
contestation (see Tolbert and Zucker 1996).  Not all diffusing practices are "neutral"; 
rational and social accounts alike tend to overlook the fact that many practices come 
loaded with implicit worldviews that are not consistent with incumbent contextual 
values. In some cases, particularly where diffusion occurs in highly-institutionalized 
fields, the illegitimacy of a practice is an important factor that affects its ability to 
diffuse through a population (Strang and Meyer 1991; Strang and Soule 1998).   
Fortunately, authors are increasingly aware of the fact that diffusion processes 
are embedded in systems where ideas and norms exert a strong influence over the 
likelihood  of  adoption  (Starbuck  1982).    Such  authors  show  that  illegitimate 
(normatively inappropriate) practices are slow to diffuse across a population. Hirsch's 
(1986)  study  of  hostile  takeovers  in  the  US  was  one  of  the  first  of  these  studies, 
showing that an illegitimate business strategy was slow to diffuse until normatively 
framed  as  a  neutral  rather  than  deviant  practice.    This  study  shows  that  cultural 
compatibility,  rather  than  the  social  structure  among  actors,  led  to  the  eventual 
integration of this practice within the system.  As the language used to describe the 
practice softened, the stigma attached to the practice lifted.  Similarly, Ahmadjian and  
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Robinson (2001) showed that public pressure to avoid an illegitimate practice slowed 
down its spread.  They showed that in Japan, where permanent employment practices 
were institutionalized, layoffs were criticized.  This public criticism constrained the 
diffusion process, despite perceived economic benefits. 
The main theme in these studies is that practices upsetting the normative order 
are less likely to diffuse (Katz 1999: 150).  This represents a slight shift in focus, 
given the theme in most social accounts.  Most studies draw attention to the social 
(typically  non-economic)  benefits  associated  with  practice  adoption;  the  more 
institutionalized a practice, the more likely a potential actor will adopt it. Cost here is 
simply opportunity cost --- cost associated with non-adoption. Failure to adopt reduces 
an  organization's  standing  in  the  eyes  of  constituents  and  jeopardizes  ties  to  key 
constituents  (DiMaggio  and  Powell  1983;  Pfeffer  and  Salancik  1978).    Studies  of 
illegitimate practices, however, focus on the social cost of adoption – standing and 
social ties -- when actors do adopt.  The more this social cost stands as a barrier to 
adoption, the lower the rate of diffusion.   
Adoption here involves normative deviance – normative avoidance rather than 
imitation  and  compliance.    Authors  describing  this  behavior  tend  to  highlight  the 
mechanisms  underlying  defection,  which  differs  significantly  from  isomorphism 
(Ahmadjian and Robinson 2001). Particularly, they tend to draw attention to cases 
where  normative  pressure  fails  to  distance  actors  from  normatively  inappropriate 
practices.  In some cases, failure can be attributed to indifference – an inherent lack of 
concern for the social cost of deviance. Leblebici et al (1991), for example, showed 
that actors outside the mainstream are often the first to adopt unconventional practices, 
particularly when these practices provide idiosyncratic value to them.  Fringe radio 
stations in this study were the first to introduce radically new formats, finding they 
realized unique value from these practices.  An earlier review by Menzel (1960) also  
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highlights this form of defector. Here he points out how actors with little to lose are 
often the first to adopt innovations that deviate from existing norms.  Using examples 
from medical and farming studies, he highlights cases where marginal actors -- actors 
only  loosely  integrated  within  their  communities  --  are  less  averse  to  crossing 
legitimate boundaries, particularly when these innovations are technically superior.   
In the case of actors who are more sensitive to public criticism, however, a 
reduced sense of vulnerability comes from different sources. One such source could be 
a  cognitively-appropriate  public  identity.    Here,  an  activity  denied  to  some  might 
"make sense" when adopted by certain others. Recent work in organizational behavior 
has  begun  to  base  organizational  classifications  and  categories  on  substantive 
interpretations  --  characteristics  that  outside  stakeholders  use  to  classify  an 
organization  within  its  context  (Hsu  and  Hannan  2005,  McKendrick  and  Carroll 
2001).  Here,  actors  outside  the  organization  apply  cognitive  frameworks  to  define 
legitimate  forms  and  form  the  basis  for  social  approval  (Hsu  and  Hannan  2005). 
Zuckerman (1999) calls this sorting process the “categorical imperative” -- outsiders 
base their approval on a discrete set of cognitively legitimate characteristics.  This 
process  implies  actors  inside  the  protective  boundary  of  legitimate  identity  are 
relatively free to behave in unconventional ways, as long as this behavior "fits” their 
identity (Edelman 1992, Rao and Sivikumar 1999).   
Protection behind peers, rather than identity, is more typically the mechanism 
driving the adoption of illegitimate practices by more conscientious actors.  Strang and 
Meyer (1993) unpacked this kind of cultural-cognitive process.  They explained that, 
when  diffusion  processes  did  not  unfold  naturally  --  when  a  practice  was  under-
theorized and had poor cultural fit -- potential adopters needed to find support among 
prior adopters. Similarly, Davis and Greve (1997) found that the public illegitimacy of 
a certain corporate takeover strategy -- the "golden parachute" -- forced the practice to  
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spread slowly.  They found that, while the pattern of diffusion for the more legitimate 
"poison pill" strategy indicated contagion or bandwagon behavior (it diffused through 
relational ties), the illegitimate practice required local protection to spread.  Under the 
umbrella  of  prior  (geographically)  local  adopters,  subsequent  "golden  parachute" 
adopters felt protected from public stigma and criticism. Here, population-level rather 
than individual-level factors helped actors overcome cultural barriers.   and Rowan 
1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Scott 1995; Zucker 1977). 
Shifts in Causal Effects 
Cases such as the spread of corporate takeover practices in Davis and Greve's 
(1997)  analysis  represent  a  promising  direction  in  diffusion  research  design.    As 
Strang and Soule (1998) point out in their review of diffusion literature, more work 
needs to be done to compare diffusion rates and mechanisms across time and space.  
One such temporal case is Tolbert and Zucker's (1983) analysis of shifts in factors 
affecting  the  diffusion  of  civil  service  reform  in  the  US.    They  demonstrate  how 
contagion took over in across a population, showing how rational forces gave way to 
isomorphism over time. Similarly, Burns and Wholley (1993) found that as more and 
more hospitals adopted the M-form administrative structure, internal characteristics 
gave way to local bandwagon effects.  Meyer et al (1992) and Collier and Messick 
(1975)  also  showed  a  shift  from  individual  to  population-level  factors  affecting 
diffusion rates over time.   
A handful of authors have shown that causal effects also shift over time during 
the diffusion of illegitimate practices. Ahmadjian and Robinson (2001), for instance, 
found that the rate of corporate lay-offs among businesses in Japan grew higher as the 
number of prior lay-offs increased.  Unlike the contagion examples given above, these 
authors  witnessed  the  emergence  of  "safety  in  numbers"  over  time  --  the  same 
mechanism supporting the diffusion of golden parachutes.  The Ahmadjian/Robinson  
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model of illegitimate practice diffusion was actually a reversal of the Tolbert/Zucker 
(1983) model.  Tolbert and Zucker found that, in in the absence of an existing, highly 
institutionalized arrangementrational factors gave way to legitimacy as determinants 
of the adoption of an innovation. In contrast, Ahmadjian and Robinson found that 
rational,  efficient  motivations  for  downsizing  in  a  highly  institutionalized  context 
became  powerful  only  after  the  process  of  legitimation.    Leblebici  et  al  (1991) 
revealed a similar temporal change in diffusion factors in a highly institutionalized 
context.   They showed that the status of the actor was the most significant factor 
affecting  diffusion  rates  of  unconventional  radio  innovations  early  on.    Adoption 
among marginal, indifferent actors gave way to adoption by mainstream, central actors 
as the diffusion process unfolded.   
In this paper,  I also study shifts in causal effects during the diffusion of a 
normatively  inappropriate  practice.  Building  on  the  literature  above,  I  show  how 
rational factors emerged over time as different social factors – first individual-level 
then population-level – led normative pressure to fail. The story of how these different 
factors affected the status of this diffusing practice in the US starts with a description 
of the landscape across which it spread.   
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CHAPTER 2 
CONTEXT 
 
The field of higher education in the US over the last few decades is well-suited 
for the study of the diffusion of a structure identified with an illegitimate practice.  A 
more  complete  understanding  of  the  diffusion  of  such  a  structure  requires  an 
understanding  of  the  shift  in  the  status  of  its  associated  practice;  among  research 
universities in the US, we bore witness to this process unfolding.  Different factors can 
affect the legitimacy of a practice, and higher education provides an excellent setting 
in which to study these factors and how they shifted over time, differentially affecting 
the speed of diffusion across different sets of actors.  Here we see how status, identity, 
and prior adopters affected the acceptance of commercialized science – a process that 
opened the door for filed-wide adoption of technology transfer structures. 
A New Practice in Higher Education 
Despite a long history of practical research among US research universities, 
the contract-based technology exchange process – what campus administrators call 
technology transfer (AUTM 2002) –  has become widespread throughout the field 
only over the last 30 years.  It wasn’t until the 1970’s that the process of patenting and 
licensing research started to emerge as more than simply a peripheral practice.  Before 
this  time,  ties  to  industry  involved  mostly  training  (e.g.  students  prepared  for 
industry), publication (e.g. papers and books for use), and consultation (e.g. business 
consultation by faculty).   
Commercial agreements between universities and industry did exist as far back 
as the 1800's (Rosenberg and Nelson 1994), but the systematic commercialization of 
campus-developed  technologies  through  formal  structures  is  a  relatively  new 
phenomenon  within  the  field  of  higher  education  (Henderson,  Jaffe,  Trajtenberg  
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1998).  Only 96 U.S. patents were granted to research universities in 1965. Nearly 
2,500  were  awarded  in  1997  (AUTM  2002).  While  most  universities  had  resisted 
direct  involvement  in  commercialized  science  only  thirty  years  earlier,  by  2000, 
technology  transfer  had  become  a  $1.1  billion  business  for  higher  education 
institutions (Mowery et al 2001).  In fact, now over half of all top research universities 
have  established  technology  transfer  offices  with  full-time  patenting  and  licensing 
professionals  (AUTM  2002),  codifying  their  entry  into  the  "realm"  of  commercial 
science (Owen-Smith 2000).   
Commercialized science was once taboo in the university; now, professionals 
in technology transfer offices are permanent fixtures on many campuses, coordinating 
intellectual property issues and bridging university activities to commercial sectors 
(Hirsch  1972;  Castilla  et  al.  2000).    Hired  to  promote  commercially-appropriate 
science and to connect research community with relevant industrial partners (Owen-
Smith 2000; AUTM 2002), technology transfer professionals are formally trained in 
science, law, and marketing and serve to facilitate tacit knowledge flows and trust-
building between the university and its customers (Owen-Smith 2000; Feldman et al. 
2002).  The impact that these professionals have made on university ledgers is yet 
unclear, but there is no doubt that the establishment of a technology transfer office is 
the mark of a university eager to sell its science (Rahm 1994, Rogers et al 2003). 
Resistance to Commercialized Science 
Before  the  widespread  commercialization  of  university  technology, 
connections between universities and sectors that used their research were under a 
different regime.  Market exchange through these industrial ties was rare, as most 
scientists believed that the proper mission and role of the university should be centered 
on basic science and service to society (Feller 1990).  Professionals in the field of 
higher  education  thus  discouraged  an  entrepreneurial  orientation,  believing  that  
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"academic capitalism" (Slaughter and Leslie 1997) - efforts to secure external funds 
through market-like behavior - would have the long-term effect of shifting research 
agendas,  culture,  and  academic  career  plans  and  prospects  away  from  the 
aforementioned  mission  and  role  (Etzkowitz  et  al  1998).    Many  faculty  members 
themselves expressed the fear that uncontrolled commercial ties to industry would lead 
to  conflicts  of  interest,  secrecy,  and  the  loss  of  the  university's  reputation  for 
objectivity (Bok 2003).  Often, scientists openly resisted commercial activity, basing 
this criticism on associated problems that included competing faculty priorities, delays 
in publishing due to patent process interference, and the reluctance by colleagues to 
share findings that could lead to a profitable discovery or scientific findings already 
under contract (Blumenthal et al. 1996).  As Stanley Cohen of Stanford, who with 
Herbert  Boyer  of  the  University  of  California  at  San  Francisco  created  the  first 
recombinant DNA clone, recalled, "My initial reaction to (patenting and licensing) 
was to question whether ... research of this type could or should be patented and to 
point out that our work had been dependent on a number of earlier discoveries by 
others . . . no invention is made in a vacuum and inventions are always dependent on 
prior work by others" (Etzkowitz and Webster 1995, p. 489).  One of the most widely-
cited  cases  of  outspoken  resistance  has  been  that  of  former  Harvard  University 
President Derek Bok, who warned to the school's Board of Overseers that "(f)lashing 
yellow lights should appear, however, whenever the institution seeks to make a profit 
on basic academic functions ... such as ... research ... in order to finance its other 
activities" (Bok 2001). 
A major piece of legislation was passed in 1980 that put pressure on these 
resistors.  In 1980, the Bayh-Dole Act was passed by US lawmakers.  The 1980 Act 
was a federal policy change that was designed to aid economic development and to 
increase  US  commercial  competitiveness  by  allowing  non-profits  (including  
 12 
universities) to patent federally funded research outcomes.  This Act gave universities 
greater freedom than before to patent discoveries and then sell these technologies to 
industry for profit. While most academics and proponents of basic science were wary 
of  commercialization,  Federal  policy-makers  saw  the  commercial  potential  of 
academic science in a very positive light. The 1970's were a time when American 
businesses were losing their international competitive edge.  They felt that the passage 
of  this  Act  would  boost  industrial  know-how  to  help  them  compete,  improving 
innovation in high-technology fields such as engineering and life sciences (Mowery, 
Nelson, Sampat & Ziedonis 2001).   
Even  after  the  Bayh-Dole  Act  was  passed,  however,  providing  university 
policy-makers  greater  financial  incentive  to  adopt  technology-transfer  offices, 
scientists continued to believe that high-quality science and generating money were 
not complementary practices (Thursby and Thursby 2002).  This was true, even as 
commercialization became more widespread (Owen-Smith 2000).  As late as 1994, a 
professor of pathology at NYU Medical Center argued in a Scientific American essay 
(Zolla-Pazner 1994) that:  
 
The demands of (technology transfer on university scientists) drain time and 
energy.  Some  research  activities  are  redirected  from  basic  science  toward  more 
immediately practical goals. The promise of continuing industrial support is seductive 
but inevitably tied to commercial products and the bottom line. The lab may find itself 
focused on an agenda set by the company. The basic research that sparked the initial 
effort may lie fallow. The spontaneity of scientific pursuit, so prized by those lucky 
enough to have investigator initiated government research grants, may be restricted. 
The speed with which the professor can share data or new reagents may be slowed. 
The result, in the worst scenario, would be deleterious for the lab, harmful for science, 
bad for society. (p. 120)  
 
Opportunities for universities to diversify their funding base through patented  
technology  became  self-evident  as  the  Bayh-Dole  Act  improved  revenue-making 
potential and a greater number of research universities embraced the marketing and  
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licensing of applied science (Powell and Owen-Smith 1998).  Nevertheless, university 
policy-makers wishing to establish commercialization programs -- particularly during 
the early years before the Bayh-Dole Act -- faced strong cultural barriers to change. 
Norm Avoidance 
While economic conditions favored the adoption of technology transfer units, 
in  this  highly  institutionalized  context,  the  loss  of  legitimacy  is  a  cost  that  actors 
typically want to avoid (DiMaggio 1988).  It seems reasonable to believe that most 
universities treaded cautiously when it came to involvement in any practical science -- 
particularly science transferred to industry for profit.  On one hand, additional income 
generation  through  patenting  was  a  lucrative  opportunity  for  research  universities; 
housing scientific disciplines with practical applications, they had the resources to roll 
supplemental income back into the research coffers through contract-based technology 
transfer.  But while they were pressured by the public to embrace their role as sources 
of basic science for the public good, there was a fear of violating norms.   
Universities that had achieved legitimacy through basic research were expected 
to have embraced the norms of the field.  All research universities -- -- those US 
institutions with a primary mission to conduct research and train graduate students to 
do so (Carnegie Commission on Higher Education 2000) -- were expected to resist 
commercialized science.  These universities were likely to have attracted attention 
and, therefore, were more likely to have been concerned about public opinion.  As 
Ahmadjian and Robinson (2001) showed, high-visibility actors were more sensitive to 
institutional constraints than lower-level actors.  This relationship between status and 
conformity  has  been  well-documented  (Blau  1960,  1963;  Dittes  and  Kelley  1956; 
Harvey and Consalvi 1960; Homans 1961; Menzel 1960).   
Some  authors  suggest,  however,  that  within  this  echelon,  the  highest-status 
actors  are  typically  the  least  concerned  with  their  status  (Dittes  and  Kelley  1956;  
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Hollander 1958, 1960).  In a highly institutionalized context, where cultural norms and 
expectations are relatively stable, the strongest  exemplars therein should feel most 
confident in the durability of their position.  Certainly, they should feel more confident 
in  their  social  acceptance  than  their  less-prestigious  counterparts,  thus  feeling 
"emboldened to deviate from conventional behavior" (Phillips and Zuckerman 2001).  
If  the  prestige  of  an  actor  is  beyond  doubt,  there  little  reason  for  him  to  avoid 
deviating  from  norms,  particularly  when  he  believes  that  deviance  is  an  effective 
means to pursue rational ends. In fact, authors have observed this behavior in many 
contexts  where  entry  barriers  privileged  the  established  early-mover  (Saloner, 
Shepard, and Podolny 2001).   
If we assume then that the cost of organizational deviance depends upon a 
university's actions as well as on its current prestige level, than we should assume that 
the  high-status  universities  felt  they  had  less  to  lose  than  others  by  adopting  a 
technology transfer office. These higher-prestige institutions within the population of 
research universities should have felt a relatively higher sense of indifference toward 
normative barriers to commercialized science. 
H1:  The  higher  the  prestige  of  a  university,  the  more  likely  it  was  to  adopt  a 
technology transfer office. 
Given  the  strong  service-based  orientation  in  higher  education,  the  more 
normatively-sensitive, lower-status universities should have been expected to reach 
out to industry only in special cases.  Such cases included universities that held a 
public identity that led stakeholders to associate practical research with serving the 
public  good.    Here,  the  line  between  what  was  normatively  proper  and  what  was 
illegitimate -- service to the public and self-interested profit-maximation --  tended to 
blur.  One such identity was that of the land-grant university.   
Land-grant institutions were created through the 1862 and 1890 Morrill Acts to  
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meet  community  technology  needs  in  agriculture  and  industry  (Jones,  Oberst,  and 
Lewis 1990).  Service to business in the community was in the form of providing 
"trained graduates, independent studies, expert advisors, and contract research" (Feller 
1997: 139).  There are now over 70 land-grant universities in the US, playing central 
roles in economic development -- helping less-developed economies advance toward 
competitive parity -- at the state and national levels (National Association of State 
Universities and  Land  Grant Colleges [NASULGC] 1987). To this day, land-grant 
universities embrace their public role, and administrators and faculty members at these 
institutions certainly speak of technology transfer activity and this public service in the 
same breath.  As a recent panel at New York State’s land-grant university concludes, 
“…technology  development  and  technology  transfer  are  important  prerequisites  if 
Cornell is to continue to fulfill its land-grant mission of improving livelihoods for the 
citizens of our community, our state, the nation, and the world” (Cornell University 
2002). 
Despite  this  conviction,  it  is  difficult  for  outside  observers  to  explain  all 
activities  undertaken  by  land-grant  universities  today  by  a  fiduciary  rather  than  a 
commercial model. Indeed, it is hard to disentangle revenue generation and economic 
development  as  motivations  for  land-grants  engaging  in  campus-corporate 
partnerships.  As an SRI International Public Policy Center report points out: 
 
Higher  education  can  meet  (economic  needs)  in  ways  that  enhance  their 
traditional missions. Developing new roles that contribute to economic development 
can enable these institutions to develop new alliances with industry and government, 
while expanding their resource base (1986). 
 
Early in the process of commercialized science diffusion, this sort of ambiguity was 
critical for on-campus advocates of commercialized technology transfer.  The fact of 
the matter is that many early technology transfer office adopters did feel the need to  
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offer  justification  for  contract-based  technology  transfer  (Hughes  2001).  
Consequently, commercialized science was done with "accompanying publicity that 
sought to persuade the public that (patenting) was to its benefit" (Hughes 2001: 547).  
As universities first started to adopt technology transfer offices in the 1970s, most 
advocates of basic science were wary of programmatic links to the patenting system.  
Lower-status  adopters  could  avoid  controversy  by  pointing  to  the  position  of  the 
patenting  office  within  a  larger  outreach  program,  answering  a  separate  service 
calling.   
It stands to reason then that the service-based public identity that land-grant 
universities  have  embraced  since  the  19
th  Century  has  kept  their  industrial  use  of 
technology relatively safe from criticism. They have been shielded from institutional 
stigma  through  the  notion  that  they  have  been  fulfilling  their  chartered  mission 
through the growth of industrial ties. This leads to the hypothesis: 
H2:  Land-grant universities adopted a technology transfer office at a faster rate than 
non-land-grants. 
As  more  commercialization  occurred  across  the  population  of  research 
universities, the stigma attached to technology transfer office adoption was likely to 
have  decreased.    If  a  single  university  adopted,  it  risked  attracting  attention  and 
criticism. Unless it was a land-grant or a high-status university, this university would 
have  avoided  the  risk  by  resisting  commercialized  science.    However,  as  more 
universities adopted, potential adopters could have shifted justification from service to 
the public good (which was reserved for land-grants) to "the time-honored explanation 
that 'everyone else is doing it'" (Ahmadjian and Robinson 2001). The early stages of 
the diffusion of technology transfer offices should have involved principally high-
status  and  land-grant  research  universities.  The  more  universities  that  went 
commercial, however, the less likely that remaining universities would have faced the  
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threat of being singled out for doing so.  This leads to the hypothesis: 
H3:  The  more  universities  that  adopted  technology  transfer  offices,  the  less  likely 
adoption were dominated by land-grant and high-status universities. 
As research shows, rational, efficient motivations for downsizing in a highly 
institutionalized  context  awaited  the  process  of  legitimation.  Where  this  research 
shows  either  a  shift  from  safety-in-numbers  to  rational  factors  (Ahmadjian  and 
Robinson  2001)  or  from  social  to  technical  characteristics  of  individual  actors 
(Leblecici et al 1991), in the field of higher education, multiple factors should have 
given way to technical consideration as the diffusion process unfolded.  High-status 
universities should have been among the first adopters, as one would assume that they 
were  among  the  least  concerned  with  the  cost  of  institutional  stigma.    Land-grant 
universities  should  also  have  been  among  the  first-movers,  as  their  service-based 
identity should have shielded them from public criticism.  Then as the number of 
adopters  increased,  the  population  of  all  research  universities  should  have  felt 
universally more comfortable commercializing their science.  While safety-in-numbers 
increased the likelihood that any university will adopt, some universities should have 
felt  more  compelled  to  adopt  than  others.  Once  the  normative  pressure  to  avoid 
commercialized  science  subsided,  the  rate  of  technology  transfer  office  adoption 
should have been highest among universities that felt the greatest economic motivation 
to commercialize their science.  As Oliver (1992) points out, as institutional pressure 
subsides, there is a chance that technical factors might cause organizations to  
deviate.  This leads to the hypothesis: 
H4: As illegitimacy pressures eroded, technical pressures to adopt technology transfer 
offices were more salient. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
DATA AND ANALYSIS 
 
This study reports on a longitudinal analysis of the adoption of technology 
transfer offices by universities in the United States from 1972 to 2000. While these 
universities vary in status, resource levels, and institutional characteristics (such as 
"land-grant"), all 225 are top US research universities.  To make the sample, these 
universities had to have awarded at least ten doctoral degrees per year across three or 
more  disciplines,  or  at  least  20  doctoral  degrees  per  year  overall.  I  rely  on 
classifications by Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, which has been widely 
used in social scientific research on higher education, to collect this list. There are 
more than 250 universities that made the list, but only 225 were at risk of adopting a 
technology transfer offices from 1972 to 2000. While I used adoptions prior to 1972 to 
calculate prior adopter variables, I dropped them from the at-risk population.   
I analyzed the diffusion of technology transfer offices in the US using discrete-
time event history models estimated using non-parametric maximum likelihood -- the 
most suitable models for longitudinal analysis of this kind (Allison 1984; Cox and 
Oakes 1984).  Since records indicated adoption of offices within a bounded period of 
time, I used a discrete time approach with the unit of time being a full year.  Three 
separate,  successive  analyses  of  technology  transfer  office  adoption  were  used.    I 
began by modeling the 1972-1981 period -- the period before the full implementation 
of the Bayh-Dole Act.  I then modeled the nine-year period following the Bayh-Dole 
Act implementation: 1982-1990.  Universities adopting offices in the previous period 
were excluded from the analysis.  During the earlier period, adoptions were slow and 
sporadic;  during  this  second  period,  the  population  of  research  universities  
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experienced the first wide-spread growth.  Finally, I modeled adoptions from 1991-
2000, a period when much pressure to avoid commercialized science had subsided.   
Dependent Variable 
I  modeled  a  single  dependent  variable  to  capture  the  diffusion  of 
commercialized science among universities. Focusing on the university commitment 
to applied science, I chose to model the adoption of a technology transfer office. The 
literature on commercialized science in higher education suggests that this event best 
represents  a  university's  decision  to  programmatically  commercialize  their  science 
(Rogers  et  al  2003).  The  membership  records  of  the  Association  of  University 
Technology  Managers  (AUTM)  lists  those  institutions  with  at  least  one  full-time 
employee  assigned  to  technology  transfer  management,  with  their  hiring  dates.  I 
believe that the AUTM accurately represents the population of university technology 
licensing offices because I could not identify any universities that have technology 
licensing offices but are not members of AUTM.  I lagged this variable one year to 
allow time for university decision makers to decide on an office then make a full-time 
employee hiring decision. 
Independent Variables 
Social Factors.  I used the following measures in my analysis to account for social 
factors – factors that I expect affected the level of insulation from normative pressure 
to avoid commercialization: 
Status -- I gathered data from the 1983 and 1993 National Research Council (NRC) 
graduate department rankings to form this variable. The NRC collects its data through 
a survey of graduate faculty at 3,634 programs around the country, who are asked to 
rank programs in their field based on the quality of research in these areas (NRC 
1995).  The  NRC  rankings  have  the  disadvantage  of  being  gathered  only  once  per 
decade. However, the 1990's measure is proven to correlate highly with more finely- 
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grained  measures  of  university  rankings  during  this  period  (Sine  et  al  2003).  
Furthermore, the NRC has the advantage of ranking specific departments on a 1 to 5 
scale.  This  specificity  allows  me  to  create  aggregate  scores  for  all  fields  and 
disciplines. For each university, I averaged the scores across disciplines to create the 
measure. I applied the 1983 measures to all years leading up to 1990 and then used the 
1993 measures for the years 1990-2000. This measure is designed to represent the 
relative status of the university, as determined by its academic peers and professionals 
in the field of higher education. 
Land-Grant – A “1” indicates land-grant members in the National Association of State 
Universities and Land Grant Colleges (NASULGC).   
Number Prior Adopters -- I measured the relative degree of safety-in-numbers among 
prior adopters through a count of research universities in the population that have 
incorporated technology transfer offices over the previous 5 years.  If the year is 1990, 
this variable measures total adoptions from 1985-1989.  I then weighed this value, 
based on the geographic distance of each adopter from the focal university.  My goal 
here was to show how, with a rise in the number of recent adopters, pressures against 
adopting a technology transfer office were minimized.  While the cumulative number 
of adopters is often used in research on innovation adoption, I felt that illegitimate 
practice adoption is likely affected most by a safety-in-numbers effect, where large 
numbers of local adoptions make a given any given adopter less visible. 
Economic  Factors.    I  used  the  following  measures  in  my  analysis  to  account  for 
economic factors that I expect affected a university's motivation to adopt a technology 
transfer office, despite the risk of public stigma:  
Number Patents -- I measured the number patents awarded to a university for each 
year in the 1972-2000 frame. All patents assigned to universities during this time were 
identified through the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) database.  
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This measure helped account for each university’s raw commercial potential.  The 
patent number was logged to normalize its distribution. 
University  Budget  --  The  fastest  growing  resource  for  technology  innovation  on 
campus is R&D funds.  Between 1993 and 2000 alone, R&D budget grew 68% for 
public  institutions  and  62%  for  private.    Previous  research  has  shown  that 
organizations  seek  to  reduce  their  dependence  on  specific  sources  of  funding.    It 
would seem reasonable then to assume that universities would look to leverage their 
budgets to create supplemental resource stream though commercial revenues.  It might 
also stand to reason that larger universities with a higher volume of research activity 
possess  the  experience  and  presence  to  capitalize  on  commercial  research 
opportunities  more  effectively  than  smaller-budget  universities.  Larger  research 
programs likely adopt offices to leverage this core advantage. I measured the yearly 
research budget for each university, drawing this data from an online database, the 
Computer-Aided  Science  Policy  Analysis  and  Research  (CASPAR)  database, 
administered  by  the  National  Science  Foundation  (NSF)’s  division  of  Science 
Resource Studies. This data set integrates information drawn from yearly surveys of 
post-secondary  institutions  and  federal  funding  agencies  with  National  Center  for 
Education  Statistics  and  National  Research  Council  data  on  higher  education 
institutions.  Along with number patents, this measure helped capture the university’s 
raw commercial potential. 
State  School  --  A  “1”  indicates  non-land-grant  state  universities.  University 
dependence  on  a  high  proportion  of  state  funding,  which  was  the  case  for  these 
universities,  should  have  offered  a  greater  incentive  to  engage  in  commercialized 
science in light of funding scarcity over the last several years.   
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Control Measures 
Medical  School  --  I  controlled  for  the  existence  of  a  university-affiliated  medical 
school  with  a  dummy  variable  of  “1”  if  the  university  had  such  a  program.  
Biotechnology  and  other  life  science  industries  increased  their  dependence  on 
academic  research  during  the  frame  (Mowery,  Nelson,  Sampat  &  Ziedonis  2001).   
Industry trimmed its internal R&D budgets and turned its attention to medical experts 
on-campus for some of this technology. The presence of an academic medical center 
on campus could have led to greater commercial potential than without.  Like budget, 
I gathered these data from the CASPAR database.   
High Tech Employees -- I measured the high-end market for university technology 
through the number of high-technology employees in the county (proximity to high-
technology firms should have improved a university’s revenue potential). I used the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ annual survey of worker demographics to measure high 
tech employment for each year during the 1972-2000 frame.  Following Hecker (1999) 
I  defined  high-technology  industries  as  those  industries  in  which  research  and 
development employment was at least twice the average for all industries.  Values are 
listed in units of 1000. 
Patent  Growth  --  I  assessed  the  possible  technological  burden  of  a  university's 
increased patenting by measuring the percent growth in patenting over the previous 
three  years.    A  value  of  "1"  for  this  dummy  variable  means  that  the  university 
increased its patents by 25% or more over the past 5 years. 
Economic  Hardship  --  I  measured  the  economic  health  of  the  university’s  local 
environment each year by calculating the inverse of the average salary-per-employee 
in the university's county. I used the County Business Patterns archival data –a subset 
of the US census record – to measure this for each year in from 1972 to 2000. The 
more depressed, perhaps the more likely the county would have lobbied the university  
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to provide assistance through community outreach.  
Density -- To capture potential competitive dynamics, I tallied the number of research 
universities in an actor's Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). 
Biotechnology  Region  --  As  mentioned  before,  growth  in  patenting  was  fastest  in 
biotechnology and other life science industries.  Location in an active biotechnology 
region  may  have  conferred  commercial  advantages  to  a  university.    Knowledge 
spillovers and closer high-tech ties within the geographic cluster may have benefitted 
the university as it sought to improve its patent portfolio (Jaffe 1986, Romer 1986).  
Following Owen-Smith and Powell (2003), I constructed a dummy variable for this 
measure.  A "1" means that the university was located in one of the following cities or 
areas: Boston, SF-Bay, Seattle, San Diego, DC/Bethesda region, or New York City. 
Results 
Tables 1 and 2 report descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables 
above.  After reviewing Table 2., I observed that a few of the variables in my analysis 
were highly correlated. To bring multicollinearity to an acceptable level, I followed 
Sine,  Haveman,  and  Tolbert’s  (2005)  suggestion  to  use  a  modified  Gram-Schmidt 
procedure (Cohen and Cohen, 1983). This procedure eliminated common variance and 
created transformed variables for number patents, budget, patent change, and status 
that were uncorrelated with one another.   
Table  3  presents  the  results  from  the  event  history  analysis  of  technology 
transfer adoption from 1972 to 1981.  Model 1 provides a baseline Model that includes 
all control variables and economic factors.  In this model, patent growth is negative 
and significant, indicating that technology transfer office adoption is not a function of 
administrative  burden.  One  might  suggest  that  high-patenting  universities  do  not 
necessarily need offices, and, therefore, avoid the burden of organizing this structure.   
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However, results from later stages of commercialization diffusion in the field do not 
support this, as Tables 4. and 5. show later.  
 
 Biotechnology region is also significant, and positive, suggesting that there is some 
consideration is made for economic factors early in the frame.  Model 2 includes the 
three  social  variables.    The  status  of  adopters  significantly  increased  their  rate  of 
adoption, supporting Hypothesis 1.  Land-grant universities were also more likely to 
adopt, supporting Hypothesis 2.  As expected, the number of prior adopters had no  
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
# patents   7399  0.69  1.06  0.00  5.00 
budget   7399  65.22  98.20  0.00  909.49 
state school  7399  0.18  0.39  0.00  1.00 
med school   7399  0.39  0.49  0.00  1.00 
patent growth  7399  0.47  0.98  0.00  5.00 
h.t. employees  7399  1.01  10.16  0.00  197.29 
density  7399  5.30  6.24  0.00  22.00 
econ. hardship  7399  0.07  0.05  0.02  1.19 
bioreg   7399  0.17  0.37  0.00  1.00 
status  7399  0.78  0.97  0.00  4.03 
land-grant  7399  0.26  0.44  0.00  1.00 
# prior adoptors  7399  4.36  3.59  0.00  12.84  
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significant  effect  during  this  period.    Furthermore,  from  1972-1981,  only 
biotechnology  region  remained  significant  among  control  measures,  and  no  other 
factors  related  to  economic  opportunity  emerged.    Hypotheses  3  and  4  were  thus 
supported. Comparing the two nested models, Model 2 had a significant increase in fit 
over Model 1. 
 
Table  4  reports  analysis  results  from  1982  to  1990.  Model  1  shows  that 
economic factors start to emerge as predictors of office adoption. Here, budget and 
medical school are both positive and significant. The number of patents is still less 
significant and negative, which is counter-intuitive. However, the positive, significant  
Table 2. Correlations 
 
  Variable  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11 
1  # patents                        
2  budget   .67                     
3  state school  .06  .01                   
4  med school   .33  .46  .02                 
5  patent growth  .75  .57  .03  .30               
6  h.t. empl  -.05  -
.05  -.02  -.05  -.03             
7  density  -.09  -
.11  -.14  -.16  -.03  .07           
8  econ. 
hardship 
-.12  -
.09  .03  .04  -.10  -.04  -.18         
9  bioreg   .05  .17  -.05  .05  .00  -.04  .00  -.19       
10  status  .57  .75  .11  .43  .51  -.05  .01  -.10  .11     
11  land-grant  .15  .32  -.28  .20  .08  -.03  -.14  .11  -.10  .22   
12  # prior adopt  .14  -
.09  .02  -.05  .11  .01  -.01  -.10  -.07  -.19  -.04  
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 emergence of two non-social factors suggests that pressure to resist commercialized 
technology may be subsiding.  Social variables are added again in Model 2.  Status is  
 still significant, but its coefficient is reduced. Also, land-grant drops out as a 
significant  variable.    Once  these  social  variables  are  included,  budget  is  the  only 
economic  factor  that  remains  significant.    Nevertheless,  this  factor’s  resilience 
suggests that, as more universities have adopted, the likelihood that additional 
 
Table 3. Event History Analysis:  
Technology Transfer Office Adoption, Early Stage (1972-1981) 
 
  Model 1      Model 2     
  Coeff.  S.E.  Sign.  Coeff.  S.E  Sign. 
# patents (log)  -0.83  0.24    -0.09  0.33   
budget   0.29  0.24    0.29  0.28   
state school 
(1/0)  0.20  0.46    0.96  0.57   
med school (1/0)  0.43  0.47    0.32  0.47   
patent growth  -0.79  0.33  *  0.15  0.44   
h.t. employees  0.01  0.19    0.01  0.17   
density  -0.10  0.18    0.07  0.19   
econ. hardship  0.04  0.03    0.03  0.04   
bioreg (1/0)  1.13  0.44  **  1.20  0.45  ** 
status        0.70  0.29  * 
land-grant (1/0)        1.13  0.53  * 
# prior adoptors        -0.18  0.28   
             
subjects    256      256   
failures    30      30   
observations    2466      2466   
LR chi2    33.18      44.20   
prob > chi2    0.0001      0.00   
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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universities  established  offices  increased  --  particularly  those  universities  with 
commercial  potential.  These  findings  support  Hypotheses  3  and  4;  land-grant  and 
high-status  characteristics  begin  to  make  way  for  safety-in-numbers  and,  to  some 
degree,  economic  factors.    As  in  Table  3,  the  second  model  in  Table  4  had  a 
significant increase in fit over the first model.   
 Table 5 reports results from the analysis covering the final 10 years of the 
frame:  1991-2000.    Model  1  findings  suggest  that  economic  factors  are  strong 
motivators during this period.  Budget (i.e., commercial potential) is still significant  
 
 
Table 4. Event History Analysis:  
Technology Transfer Office Adoption, Middle Stage (1982-1990) 
 
  Model 1      Model 2     
  Coeff.  S.E.  Sign.  Coeff.  S.E  Sign. 
# patents (log)  -0.50  0.21  *  -0.21  0.17   
budget   0.68  0.17  **  0.98  0.24  ** 
state school (1/0)  -0.01  0.34    -0.22  0.41   
med school (1/0)  0.84  0.30  **  0.34  0.32   
patent growth  -0.35  0.20    -0.13  0.15   
h.t. employees  -0.21  0..27    -0.22  0..28   
density  -0.03  0.17    -0.11  0.18   
econ. hardship  0.00  0.02    0.01  0.03   
bioreg (1/0)  -0.57  0.51    -0.61  0.52   
status        0.86  0.19  ** 
land-grant (1/0)        -0.27  0.39   
# prior adoptors        0.26  0.07  * 
             
subjects    225      225   
failures    56.00      56   
observations    1614      1614   
LR chi2    51.90      76.00   
prob > chi2    0.00      0.00   
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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and positive. The number of patents (also commercial potential) is significant as well; 
only in this analysis, number of patents is positive.  While medical school is no longer 
significant, state school (required funding) is significant and positive.  
To test the strength of this idea, Model 2 includes the social variables. Model 
fit  is  improved,  and  only  prestige  is  a  significant  predictor  of  technology  transfer 
adoption.  The three economic factors in Model 1 are still significant in Model 2, 
which  provides  strong  support  for  Hypothesis  4,  as  expected.    Comparing  results 
across time periods, one can see that economic factors are not only highly predictive, 
but these factors also have greater predictive power during 1991-2000 than during  
Table 5. Event History Analysis:  
Technology Transfer Office Adoption, Late Stage (1991-2000) 
  Model 1      Model 2     
  Coeff.  S.E.  Sign.  Coeff.  S.E  Sign. 
# patents (log)  0.44  0.13  **  0.34  0.15  * 
budget   0.65  0.18  **  0.85  0.23  ** 
state school (1/0)  1.06  0.30  **  1.04  0.37  ** 
med school (1/0)  -0.06  0.32    -0.28  0.33   
patent growth  -0.14  0.10    -0.22  0.11   
h.t. employees  -0.10  0.09    -0.10  0.09   
density  -0.16  0.23    -0.22  0.24   
econ. hardship  0.03  0.03    0.01  0.03   
bioreg (1/0)  -0.03  0.54    -0.24  0.56   
status        0.82  0.24  ** 
land-grant (1/0)        0.23  0.41   
# prior adoptors        0.15  0.08   
             
subjects    169      169   
failures    55      55   
observations    1403      1403   
LR chi2    55.77      70.10   
prob > chi2    0      0   
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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1982-1990.  These  results,  coupled  with  the  reduced  impact  of  both  number  prior 
adopters and land-grant mission, suggest that social factors started to make way for 
economic  factors  --  commercial  potential  and  funding  requirements  --  through  the 
three decades observed. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Most studies of technology transfer activity have emphasized the economic 
and  social  factors  that  have  affected  the  relative  success  of  universities 
commercializing  their  science  over  the  last  10-15  years  and  the  cultural  problems 
associated with this on-campus activity.  While this research has provided good insight 
to help us better understand the context within which commercialization spread, little 
research has examined how cultural shifts in the views of the commercialization of 
university research affected the importance of economic factors in determining the 
adoption  of  technology  transfer  offices  throughout  the  population  --  how  cultural 
barriers  and  normative  protection  mechanisms  interact  to  shape  the  speed  and 
direction of technology transfer office adoption among major research universities in 
the US. An investigation of diffusion trends across three decades of commercialized 
science  shows  that  individual  and  population-level  factors  affected  the  impact  of 
normative pressure to resist university technology transfer activity.  Furthermore, it 
shows that these factors shifted over time.   
The meaning of these social factors can be traced to the relative pressure that 
universities faced as they adopted an illegitimate practice. Social cost avoidance was a 
much greater concern than relative economic benefit early on.  In fact, neither budget 
nor patent levels were strong predictors of technology transfer office adoption during 
the 1970s.  During this time, when adoption was sparse, the first-moving high-status 
and  land-grant  universities  felt  the  least  amount  of  pressure  to  avoid  moving  into 
commercialized science.  High-status universities that were indifferent toward social 
pressure  and land-grants that had a service-based identity that shielded  them from  
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criticism were positioned to worry the least about stigma.  
Then, as years went by and more universities established technology transfer 
offices to bring technology to market, diffusion was no longer channeled through just 
the land-grant and high-status universities.  While indifference and identity were the 
most effective layers of insulation from criticism through the 1970s, these individual 
characteristics gave way to population-level factors in the 1980's. Results show that 
normative protection became more a function of the number of prior adopters than 
land-grant identity, and while status was still important during this time, its impact 
was reduced.   
As  the  analysis  then  suggests,  economic  pressures  to  adopt  became  more 
salient as the legitimacy of engaging in commercialized science increased. During the 
final  ten  years  of  the  frame,  universities  that  could  realize  the  greatest  economic 
benefit  from  the  technology  transfer  office  –  universities  with  high  commercial 
potential or funding needs – were comfortable enough to adopt without the need for 
normative  protection.  Land-grant  identity  and  safety-in-numbers  were  insignificant 
predictors of technology transfer adoption throughout the 1990’s. 
In  summary,  key  decision  makers  within  an  organization  must  deal  with 
cultural inconsistencies that exist between an efficient practice and its environment. 
To minimize the cost of social criticism, cultural resources must be available to these 
decision-makers if they are to fully realize the economic benefit that a practice might 
hold  in  store  for  them.  Results  here  show  that  in  the  field  of  higher  education, 
specifically, a university’s status or identity as a land grant university, then its position 
among early adopters, insulated decision-makers in the field of higher education from 
this social stigma.  Universities with a mission that required dealing with practical 
science, a level of status that was relatively immune from institutional criticism, and a 
comfortable  number  of  prior  adopters  around  them  that  they  could  point  to  for  
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protection were the quickest to adopt an illegitimate practice – the commercialization 
their own technology for profit through a technology transfer office. 
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